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Although negative expectations may have the benefit of softening the blow when a negative event occurs,
they also have the cost of making people feel worse while they are waiting for that event to happen. Three
studies suggest that the cost of negative expectations is greater than the benefit. In 2 laboratory
experiments and a field study, people felt worse when they were expecting a negative than a positive
event; but once the event occurred, their prior expectations had no measurable influence on how they felt.
These results suggest that anticipating one’s troubles may be a poor strategy for maximizing positive
affect.
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It is tragic for the soul to be apprehensive of the future and wretched
in anticipation of wretchedness. What madness it is to anticipate one’s
troubles!
—Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BC–65 AD; 1925)
Is it really madness to anticipate one’s troubles? Seneca (1925)
argued that the cost of anticipating a negative event is that it
produces an unpleasant state of dread (“I expect her to say no when
I ask her out and I feel bad just thinking about it”). However, he
failed to mention the benefits, namely, that anticipating a negative
event leads to affective attenuation when the event turns out badly
(“I always knew she’d say no, so I’m not that disappointed”) and
affective amplification when it turns out well (“I thought she’d say
no—so I’m absolutely delighted that she said yes!”). The antici-
pation of positive events has precisely the opposite set of costs and
benefits. Anticipating a positive event produces a pleasant state of
savoring (“I expect him to say yes when I ask him out, and I feel
good just thinking about it”), but it also produces affective atten-
uation when the event turns out well (“I always knew he’d say yes,
so I’m not that excited”) and affective amplification when it turns
out badly (“I thought he’d say yes—so I’m terribly disap-
pointed!”). In short, as Table 1 shows, the anticipation of future
events has pre-event affective consequences (Berns et al., 2006;
Elster & Loewenstein, 1992; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2000), but it
also has postevent affective consequences of the opposite valence
(Feather, 1969; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Mellers, Schwartz, &
Ritov, 1999; Shepperd & McNulty, 2002).
How likely are these pre-event and postevent consequences to
accrue? Although people think of amplification and attenuation as
common phenomena, research suggests that they occur under
limited circumstances. For example, amplification and attenuation
are typically observed in studies that measure affect immediately
after an event occurs. People who are given a series of gustatory
rewards every few seconds show greater activation in brain regions
associated with subjective pleasure when they cannot predict the
value of the reward on each trial (Berns, McClure, Pagnoni, &
Montague, 2001), and people who engage in a series of brief
gambles or perform a series of brief tasks report more intense
affective responses on trails on which they receive unexpected
outcomes (McGraw, Mellers, & Ritov, 2004; Mellers, Schwartz,
Ho, & Ritov, 1997). Amplification and attenuation are also com-
monly observed in studies that measure postevent affect after
people are explicitly reminded of their prior expectations (Shep-
perd & McNulty, 2002).
On the other hand, studies in which people report their affect
after a short delay and/or are not reminded of their prior expecta-
tions typically provide little evidence of either amplification or
attenuation. Although many studies report positive correlations
between (a) people’s affective reactions, and (b) the discrepancy
between their predicted and actual outcomes, Marshall and Brown
(2006) demonstrated that this approach is susceptible to statistical
artifact. Evidence for amplification and attenuation in these situ-
ations requires an analytic approach that independently estimates
the affective consequences of events and expectancies, and Mar-
shall and Brown reported that “in our search of the literature we
could not find one study that used this analytic approach” (p. 45).
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277They concluded that there is little evidence for either amplification
or attenuation.
We believe that when taken as a whole, the literature suggests
that amplification and attenuation do occur immediately after an
event when an expectation is active in memory and the discrep-
ancy between it and the event is particularly salient, but that these
postevent consequences quickly dissipate as the event begins to
command the person’s attention and the expectation begins to fade
from awareness (Novemsky & Ratner, 2003). This claim has
important implications. The novelist Thomas Hardy suggested that
holding negative expectations of the future was a “sure game. You
cannot lose at it; you may gain. It is the only view of life in which
you can never be disappointed” (Pearce, 2002, p. 40). According to
Hardy, negative expectations are always beneficial because they
amplify positive affect and attenuate negative affect, and people do
seem to “brace for the worst” in the hope of attenuating negative
affective responses or amplifying positive affective responses to an
imminent event (Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; Taylor
& Sheppard, 1998). Alas, the scientific literature suggests that
there are at least two problems with this strategy. First, as the
research described above suggests, negative expectations may not
provide the benefits of amplification or attenuation in many or
even most circumstances. Second, this strategy ignores the fact
that negative expectations have costs in the pre-event period—
namely, people who are expecting the worse feel bad while they
are doing so. If the costs of negative expectations are common and
easily produced while the benefits are not, then the sure game may
be a sucker’s bet.
In three studies, we sought to determine whether negative ex-
pectations produce postevent benefits that justify their pre-event
costs. In Studies 1a and 1b, we measured the costs and benefits of
negative expectations in a laboratory experiment, and in Study 2
we measured them in a field setting. We expected to find that the
pre-event costs of negative expectations would be more readily
observed than the postevent benefits.
Studies 1a and 1b
In Studies 1a and 1b, participants completed a personality as-
sessment and waited for 10 min before receiving their results.
During this waiting period, participants were led to have positive,
negative, or no expectations about the results. Participants reported
their affective states during the waiting period. Participants were
then told that the results were negative (Study 1a) or positive
(Study 1b) and then reported their affective states again.
Method
Participants in Study 1a were 36 Harvard undergraduates (20
women and 16 men), and participants in Study 1b were 39 Harvard
undergraduates (22 women and 17 men). All participants received
either $5 or course credit for their participation.
Participants were told that they would be taking a computerized
personality test and would be classified as one of three types (A,
B, or C). Participants read a brief description of each type and
learned that A was the best, B was intermediate, and C was the
worst. These descriptions had been used in previous studies
(Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, & Wilson, 2004; Gilbert, Pinel,
Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). Participants were told that
the test was reliable and valid when scored by a psychologist, but
that because this was so expensive and time consuming the exper-
imenter was hoping to develop computer software that could
quickly and cheaply predict a psychologist’s classification. The
experimenter explained that participants’ tests would be scored by
a psychologist who was in another room and that while this was
occurring an experimental computer program would analyze their
answers and attempt to predict the psychologist’s classification.
All participants answered 18 ambiguous questions on a com-
puter (e.g., “What two adjectives would you use to describe your
closest friend?” and “If you could wake up tomorrow having
gained one new ability or quality, what would it be?”). When
participants were finished, their answers were ostensibly submitted
to both the experimental computer program and the psychologist.
Participants were then randomly assigned to the positive expecta-
tion, negative expectation,o rno expectation condition. Partici-
pants in the positive and negative expectation conditions were told
that while they were waiting for the psychologist to classify them
they could press a key to see the computer’s prediction of the
psychologist’s classification. Participants were reminded that the
computer program was not always accurate in predicting a psy-
chologist’s classification, but that it would probably give them “a
sense of what to expect.” When participants pressed the key, the
computer listed the probabilities that participants in the positive
expectation condition would be classified as an A, B, or C as 91%,
9%, and 1%, respectively, and that participants in the negative
expectation condition would be classified as an A, B, or C as 1%,
9%, and 91%, respectively. Participants in the no expectation
condition were not given an opportunity to view the computer’s
predictions.
Five minutes after pressing the key, the experimenter asked
participants to indicate how happy and how disappointed they felt
by marking a pair of 12-cm linear analog scales that were anchored
at the end points with the phrases not at all and extremely. Five
Table 1
Costs and Benefits of Expectations
Event
Expectation
Positive Negative
Positive Pre-event benefit  Savoring Pre-event cost  Dread
Postevent cost  Attenuation Postevent benefit  Amplification
Negative Pre-event benefit  Savoring Pre-event cost  Dread
Postevent cost  Amplification Postevent benefit  Attenuation
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each participant that he or she had been classified by the psychol-
ogist as a Type C (Study 1a) or as a Type A (Study 1b). Two
minutes after receiving this information, the experimenter asked
participants to complete the same scales they had completed ear-
lier. Thus, the order of events was as follows: Expectation 3
5-min delay 3 pre-event report 3 5-min delay 3 event 3 2-min
delay 3 postevent report. It is worth noting that by measuring
pre-event affect 5 min before the event but measuring postevent
affect 2 min after the event we stacked the deck in favor of finding
greater postevent than pre-event effects (which was the opposite of
what we expected to find).
Study 1a Results
Participants in Study 1a were given negative feedback. Partic-
ipants’ happiness and disappointment scores were negatively cor-
related in the pre-event period (r  .56, p  .001) and the
postresults period (r  .42, p  .01), and thus we created a
pre-event positive affect index and a postevent positive affect
index by subtracting participants’ reports of disappointment from
their reports of happiness. These indexes were submitted to a 2
(period: pre-event or postevent) by 3 (expectation: positive, neg-
ative, none) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA),
which revealed a Period  Expectation interaction, F(2, 33) 
5.45, p  .01. As Table 2 shows, participants felt worse 5 min
before the event when they had negative rather than positive
expectations, t(24)  3.91, p  .001, but participants who had
negative and positive expectations felt equally bad 2 min after the
event, t(24)  1. In short, negative expectations had pre-event
costs but no postevent benefits.
Study 1b Results
Participants in Study 1b were given positive feedback. Partici-
pants’ happiness and disappointment scores were negatively cor-
related in the pre-event period (r  .71, p  .001) and the
postevent period (r  .56, p  .001), and thus we created a
pre-event positive affect index and a postevent positive affect
index as in Study 1a. These indexes were submitted to a 2 (period:
pre-event or postevent) by 3 (expectation: positive, negative, none)
repeated measures ANOVA, which revealed a Period  Expecta-
tion interaction, F(2, 33)  5.45, p  .01. As Table 2 shows,
participants felt better 5 min before the event when they had
positive rather than negative expectations, t(25)  2.30, p  .03,
but participants who had positive and negative expectations felt
equally good 2 min after the event, t(25)  1. In short, positive
expectations had pre-event benefits and no postevent costs.
1
Study 2
In Study 2 we sought to determine whether the pattern of results
we observed in the laboratory—namely, pre-event consequences
without postevent consequences—would also be observed in a
common field setting.
Method
Participants were 138 Harvard undergraduates (70 men and 68
women) in an introductory psychology course who participated for
course credit. Participants received a questionnaire by email about
48 hr after taking their midterm exam and about 72 hr before
receiving their scores. This pre-event measure asked them to
predict their score on the exam by completing three items: (a)
“How worried are you about your grade on the exam?”, based on
a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all worried)t o7( extremely
worried); (b) “How do you think you did on the exam?”, based on
a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely well)t o7( extremely
poor); and (c) “How do you think your performance on the exam
will compare to other students?”, based on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (much worse)t o7( much better). The pre-event measure
also asked participants to complete the Positive and Negative
Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Partic-
ipants received a second questionnaire by email about 24 hr after
receiving their grade on the exam. This postevent measure asked
them to complete the PANAS. Participants’ responses were coded
with an encrypted identifier that allowed their responses to be
linked to their exam grades.
Results
Of the 138 participants who completed the pre-event measure,
53 male and 60 female participants (82%) also completed the
postevent measure. The three items on the pre-event measure that
measured participants’ expectations about their exam scores were
1 Statistical power in Studies 1a and 1b was low, and the results of these
studies should not be taken to mean that expectations cannot have
postevent effects. Rather, they should be taken to mean that at any given
level of statistical power, pre-event effects are stronger and thus easier to
detect than are postevent effects.
Table 2
Affect Index in Studies 1a and 1b
Expectation Pre-event period Postevent period
Negative event (Study 1a)
Positive (n  13)
M 5.97b 2.34c
SD 2.37 4.74
None (n  10)
M 2.98a –1.11c
SD 4.30 3.64
Negative (n  13)
M 0.24a 0.95c
SD 4.73 4.79
Positive event (Study 1b)
Positive (n  13)
M 3.82a 3.90c
SD 3.62 3.64
None (n  12)
M 4.04a 4.79c
SD 3.12 3.35
Negative (n  14)
M 0.10b 4.70c
SD 4.67 3.38
Note. Means represent affect indexes that range from –12 (not at all
happy and extremely disappointed)t o1 2( extremely happy and not at all
disappointed). Within columns, means with different subscripts differ at
p  .05.
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expectation index. Both the pre-event measure and the postevent
measure included the PANAS. Both the positive and negative
affect subscales of the PANAS were internally consistent in both
the pre-event and postevent periods (all   .87). We created a
pre-event affect index and a postevent affect index by subtracting
the sum of the negative PANAS items from the sum of the positive
PANAS items.
The correlation between the expectation index and the affect
index from the pre-event period was r  .44, p  .001. The more
negative students’ expectations were, the worse they felt in the
pre-event period. The postevent affect index was used as the
dependent measure in a hierarchical regression, with participants’
exam scores entered first and the expectation index entered second.
This approach was designed to estimate attenuation/amplification
effects independent of (i.e., after controlling for) event effects. If
negative expectations confer benefits to participants who received
low scores (attenuation) as well as those who received high scores
(amplification), then negative expectations should be associated
with more positive postevent affect for all participants, regardless
of the grade they received. As Table 3 shows, participants who
scored well on the exam felt better after receiving their grade than
did participants who scored poorly. However, after controlling for
the score they received, participants’ expectations about those
scores were unrelated to their affective states in the postevent
period. In short, participants with positive expectations felt better
3 days before receiving their grades but did not feel worse a day
after actually receiving them, whereas participants with negative
expectations felt worse 3 days before receiving their grades but did
not feel better a day after receiving them.
General Discussion
In three studies, expectations had affective consequences in the
pre-event period but not in the postevent period. Before receiving
personality feedback, participants who had negative expectations
were less happy than participants who had positive expectations;
but after receiving feedback, participants who had had negative
expectations were no happier than participants who had had pos-
itive expectations. Before receiving their grades, students who had
negative expectations were less happy than students who had
positive expectations; but after receiving their grades, students
who had had negative expectations were no happier than students
who had had positive expectations. In other words, expectations
about an event mattered until the event happened, at which time
the event—and not people’s prior expectations about it—became
the determinant of their affective states. Although expecting the
worst can sometimes make people feel better in the postevent
period (Mellers et al., 1997) and can sometimes induce them to
work harder in the pre-event period (Norem & Cantor, 1986), our
studies suggest that the affective benefits of negative expectations
may be more elusive than their costs.
If negative expectations do little to attenuate the affective con-
sequences of receiving a poor exam score or unflattering person-
ality feedback, then why do most people seem to have compelling
intuitions to the contrary (Shepperd & McNulty, 2002)? One
reason may be that expectations are most likely to have postevent
consequences in the early moments of the postevent period (Berns
et al., 2001; McGraw et al., 2004; Mellers et al., 1997; Shepperd
& McNulty, 2002), and research has shown that when people think
about events that extend over time, they tend to think about the
events’ early moments (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Kahneman,
1999). For example, when people are asked to imagine being
paraplegic they tend to imagine becoming paraplegic, and because
paraplegia is surely worse on the first day than the one-thousandth
day, people typically overestimate how bad that state would be
(Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978; Gilbert et al., 1998;
Riis et al., 2005; Ubel et al., 2001). It may be that when students
imagine how they will feel if they receive a bad grade on a test,
they imagine getting the bad grade rather than having the bad
grade—in other words, they imagine the opening moment of the
postevent period in which their negative expectations are most
likely to have affective consequences rather than the more numer-
ous moments that follow in which their expectations may have no
effect whatsoever. Expectations may have only brief conse-
quences, but because people who are thinking about a future event
tend to imagine the very moments in which such consequences are
most likely to be realized, they may overestimate the benefits—
and underestimate the costs—of expecting the worst. It may be
that as Seneca (1925) noted nearly 2 millennia ago, “He who
suffers before it is necessary suffers more than is necessary”
(p. 123).
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